Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez is set to visit China for the fourth time from April 11 to 15. His first visit in March 2023 celebrated the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Spain and China.

Since then, Sánchez has made annual visits to China, each time concluding multiple bilateral economic cooperation agreements.

These visits are part of the broader trend of European leaders engaging with Beijing post COVID-19.

There are two main reasons for this increased engagement.

First, China's growing influence in international relations has prompted European leaders to seek its active involvement, especially in mediating the Ukraine crisis.

Second, there is a pressing need to revive bilateral economic relations after the pandemic-induced slowdown, compounded by the energy and economic crises stemming from the Ukraine crisis and the trade tensions initiated by the United States during Donald Trump's presidencies.

But Sánchez has been more proactive than most European leaders.

He is striving to raise Spain's profile as a defender of liberal values and the multilateral regime, both in Europe and internationally.

This has influenced Spain's relationship with the US.

Sánchez publicly disagreed with the US on raising NATO's financing to 5 percent of a member's GDP, arguing that Spain's current defense budget of 2-2.1 percent of its GDP was adequate and that higher spending would affect the country's public services.

More recently, Sánchez stood up to the US on the war against Iran, deeming it illegal. Spain barred the US from using the military bases of Rota and Morón, and closed its airspace to US military planes.

In response, the US threatened trade retaliation against Spain and even suggested withdrawing from NATO.

The US has also questioned the use of NATO since several members did not participate in the Iran conflict.

Thus, the quarrel with Spain has become a symbol of the division between the US and Europe, and the cracks in the transatlantic relationship.

Spain's defiance of the US reflects a broader shift.

European leaders are increasingly skeptical of Washington's commitment to international rules and the security guarantees made to Europe after World War II, especially following the tensions over Greenland.

On the other hand, Spain's increased engagement with China is strategically beneficial for the country in the long term, especially during a global economic crisis.

It helps diversify supply chains and promote economic growth based on the industries of the future — artificial intelligence, semiconductors, electric vehicles and batteries — where China is a global leader.

In these areas, Spain has a lot of ground to catch up with other European countries because it lagged in promoting economic ties with China and missed the opportunities provided by China's strong economic growth.

By prioritizing stronger ties with China, Spain is temporarily sacrificing its relationship with the US. It is betting on a more liberal US presidency in the future.

This enhances the country's international profile as a defender of a rules-based order and liberalism.

However, this strategy may not become the new paradigm for the European Union's China policy due to the cacophony of views among member states.

For instance, Hungary and Lithuania have very divergent views, while some member states follow a transactional approach toward China.

Spain's influence in shaping Europe's trade policy is limited. This was evident from Spain's failure to shift the balance in the EU's vote on the imposition of tariffs on EV in 2024.

At the same time, the implementation of the economic security agenda varies among EU members, reflecting differing relations with China.

Nonetheless, it is clear that China has strengthened its partnership with Spain — a bilateral relationship that Spain is willing to deepen further.

Amid increasingly polarized views in Europe, which is steadily moving toward economic security and de-risking, the support of the fourth largest economy in the EU might be significant for China.

The author is a researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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