Recent developments show that the European Union remains torn between politicizing its economic relationship with China or managing it. On the one hand, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has indicated that the bloc's latest sanctions package against Russia could target companies in China and other countries, and the European Commission is debating a more restrictive trade posture against China designed to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains through new regulations on artificial intelligence, strategic industries and technology sectors.

On the other hand, Vice-Premier Zhang Guoqing participated via video link in a meeting with the developed economies on the global convergence of economic growth on Thursday, which was proposed by France. And talks were held in Brussels on Tuesday between Ling Ji, vice-minister of commerce and deputy China international trade representative, and Ditte Juul Jorgensen, director-general for trade and economic security at the European Commission, signaling that neither side wishes to abandon engagement.

The EU's China dilemma increasingly resembles a struggle between economic reality and geopolitical delusions. China remains one of the EU's major trading partners. According to Chinese customs data, bilateral trade exceeded $830 billion in 2025, while two-way investment and industrial cooperation continue to expand in sectors ranging from electric vehicles and clean energy to advanced manufacturing, pharmaceuticals and green technologies.

Geopolitics, by contrast, makes the EU define China, simultaneously, as a partner, competitor and systemic rival — a formulation that has increasingly become a staple of Brussels' policy documents. Yet it has never resolved the practical question of how the EU should balance those competing identities. In practice, the framework often serves as an intellectual justification for restrictive measures while preserving the language of cooperation. The result is pie-in-the-sky policy divorced from what's happening on the ground.

For years, some EU policymakers have attached a growing number of political conditions to economic engagement with China. Human rights concerns, ideological differences, "security" considerations, industrial policy disputes, allegations of "overcapacity", "subsidy" investigations, "anti-dumping" measures and "de-risking" initiatives have accumulated layer upon layer. Collectively, they have created a dense web of political constraints around one of the world's most important economic relationships.

Yet despite these obstacles, China-EU economic ties have remained resilient. That resilience reflects a simple reality often overlooked in EU political debates. Businesses, manufacturers and consumers continue to find mutual benefit in cooperation. This should prompt some reflection, however uncomfortable it might be, in Brussels.

The EU's economic difficulties today are not primarily the result of its engagement with China. The bloc's challenges are largely internal and self-created: sluggish productivity growth, excessive bureaucracy, fragmented capital markets, energy vulnerabilities, demographic pressures and persistent divisions among member states. China has become a convenient target in many political discussions because some EU politicians portray it as an external explanation for problems that are fundamentally domestic.

That does not mean differences between China and the EU do not exist. The question is whether differences become barriers to cooperation or subjects for negotiation.

This is why the China-EU trade and investment consultation mechanism matters. It provides an institutional platform on which disputes can be managed through dialogue rather than unilateral measures. Trade frictions between major economies are inevitable. What matters is how they are handled. Although it is open to dialogue, Beijing will take necessary measures to safeguard China's legitimate interests in response to discriminatory actions.

The choice facing Brussels is therefore not between dependence and confrontation. It is between pragmatic engagement and self-defeating escalation. China and the EU possess vast common interests despite their differences. A mature relationship requires managing disagreements without allowing them to dominate the agenda.