Global developments highlight the fundamental reality that the transatlantic alliance is not making Europe safer

In an international order long dominated by Western powers, particularly since the end of the Cold War, concepts of “ally” and “alliance”, exemplified by NATO, have functioned as instruments of collective security while simultaneously evolving into mechanisms of geopolitical power. This transformation has been associated with interventionist practices that contest state sovereignty under international law, including the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia, the Iraq War and NATO’s eastward enlargement. In particular, NATO’s eastward enlargement altered Europe’s strategic balance by intensifying Russia’s security concerns. Rather than consolidating a stable post-Cold War order, the alliance has perpetuated structural antagonism, contributing to protracted security tensions that ultimately culminated in the Ukraine crisis.

Ironically, these consequences are now visible within the alliance itself. The once-unshakable transatlantic partnership shows clear signs of internal strain, most notably in Europe’s split between two competing strategic identities: a NATO-centric Europe and a sociopolitical Europe. The former remains militarily dependent and strategically subordinate, while the latter seeks autonomy as a global “normative power” and a “third force”. Europe’s lack of real strategic autonomy prevents reconciliation between these identities, eroding internal cohesion and external credibility. Pulled in opposing directions, Europe is unable to act as a unified actor and is increasingly vulnerable to external pressure, including from its own allies. In securing continued United States military support for Ukraine, Europe has largely adopted a posture of silence and deference.

Recent tensions between the US and Europe — including explicit trade and territorial threats toward allies — highlight a fundamental reality: alliances do not eliminate power asymmetries. When interests diverge, even close partners can be subject to coercion. The belief that shared values alone ensure solidarity is increasingly proving illusory, as history shows that alliances cannot override national sovereignty or core strategic priorities. As former British prime minister Lord Palmerston famously said of Britain, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

The US has redefined its national interests and recalibrated its relations with NATO and Europe, leaving the alliance facing its greatest strain not from external adversaries, but from its own leading member. The current disunity within the alliance in the context of the US ongoing war against Iran exemplifies the dysfunction within the Western alliance. In an interview with Al Jazeera on March 30, Marco Rubio said the US would reassess its relationship with NATO after the war in Iran, citing European allies’ refusal to permit US base operations; meanwhile, in an interview with The Telegraph on April 1, Donald Trump called NATO a “paper tiger” and said he was “strongly considering” withdrawing the US from the alliance.

The ongoing confrontation between the US and Denmark over Greenland, in which the US has openly threatened its NATO ally with tariffs and coercive measures in pursuit of territorial acquisition, illustrates a broader shift in the current era of great power competition: Allies are only instruments subordinate to the ambitions of the hegemonic power. The crisis of the NATO alliance is not an anomaly; rather, it is the inevitable outcome of arrangements that conflate loyalty with obedience and partnership with hierarchy.

The concepts of “ally” and “alliance” therefore require reconsideration in light of recent global developments. Western alliances that claim to uphold sovereignty, international law and democracy increasingly undermine these principles through expansion, intervention and coercion.

The limitations of alliance politics are evident across three major international relations perspectives. Realism shows how alliances intensify power imbalances and provoke counterbalancing. Liberalism exposes the gap between professed universal norms and their selective application, eroding legitimacy through normative hypocrisy. Constructivism highlights how alliances harden identity-based divisions, reinforcing “us versus them” dynamics that limit diplomatic flexibility and obstruct cross-bloc cooperation.

Contemporary Western discourse often characterizes China as a state with “no allies” or “few allies”. This critique presupposes that formal alliances are a necessary indicator of international influence or strategic success. Yet, the historical experience of the Cold War profoundly shaped China’s understanding of alliance politics in terms of risks of entanglement, dependency and bloc confrontation. Since then, China’s foreign policy has consistently adhered to the principle of non-alignment, eschewing formal military alliances and avoiding arrangements directed against third parties.

Rather than pursuing treaty-based alliances, China has emphasized flexible partnerships, strategic autonomy, and issue-based cooperation, exemplified by the Belt and Road Initiative. This approach reflects a preference for networked economic and diplomatic engagement over bloc-based security arrangements, enabling China to expand its international influence while avoiding the formal obligations and constraints associated with traditional alliances.

The irony is, Europe, bound and subordinated by a strong NATO alliance, is facing an increasingly evident existential challenge. Europe’s limited capacity for political and strategic innovation has reinforced structural dependence and narrowed its room for autonomous action, generating the need for a comprehensive and forward-looking reassessment. Ideally, this critical moment should trigger a broad European deliberative process involving scholars, policymakers, civil society and the media, centered on a fundamental question: Where should Europe position itself over the next two decades, and through what visions, strategies and forms of new thinking?

Such future-oriented reflection is not without historical precedent in Europe. From the 1960s through the 1980s, Europe played a leading role in global debates on long-term development, sustainability and security, as illustrated by initiatives such as the Club of Rome, the Brundtland Commission and the Dag Hammarskj?ld Foundation’s “What Now? Another Development” report. Reviving this tradition of strategic foresight could also create constructive points of engagement with contemporary initiatives from other global actors, including China’s proposals on security, development and global governance.

At the core of this reassessment lies the enduring question of common security. For Europe, this entails redefining its relationship with Russia and the Middle East, and exploring the contours of a predominantly civilian system of conflict management and peace-building. It also requires the development of a credible and integrated defensive posture — civilian and military — alongside renewed efforts in arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures. Given geographic proximity and historical interdependence, dialogue with Russia remains particularly significant, while broader engagement with the Middle East, Eurasia and China is equally necessary in a globalized security environment.

Although such perspectives are often dismissed as unrealistic or overly idealistic, such assessments underestimate the strategic options available to a Europe of nearly 500 million people. In a context of increasing US inwardness, Europe has greater scope to transcend a rigid alliance-centered mindset and to articulate policies oriented toward its own common good, while engaging in cooperative alignment with other regions. This critical juncture calls for constructive ideas and inclusive deliberation at national, regional and global levels, suited to an emerging multipolar order — one that requires moving beyond assumptions shaped by outdated alliances and cultivating the intellectual and political capacity to envision alternative future trajectories rather than merely revisiting the past and the nostalgia of the “good old days”.

Li Xing is a Yunshan leading scholar and the director of the European Research Center at Guangdong Institute for International Strategies at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, and an adjunct professor of international relations at Aalborg University, Denmark. Jan Oberg is a former professor, the co-founder and the director of the independent Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, Sweden.

The authors contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.